

Registering Ideology in the Creation of Social Entrepreneurs: Intermediary Organizations, ‘Ideal Subject’ and the Promise of Enjoyment

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Abstract Research on social entrepreneurship has taken an increasing interest in issues pertaining to ideology. In contrast to existing research which tends to couch ‘ideology’ in pejorative terms (i.e., something which needs to be overcome), this paper conceives ideology as a key mechanism for rendering social entrepreneurship an object with which people can identify. Specifically, drawing on qualitative research of arguably one of the most prolific social entrepreneurship intermediaries, the global Impact Hub network, we investigate how social entrepreneurship is narrated as an ‘ideal subject,’ which signals toward others what it takes to lead a meaningful (working) life. Taking its theoretical cues from the theory of justification advanced by Boltanski, Chiapello and Thévenaut, and from recent affect-based theorizing on ideology, our findings indicate that becoming a social entrepreneur is considered not so much a matter of struggle, hardship, and perseverance but rather of ‘having fun.’ We caution that the promise of enjoyment which pervades portrayals of the social entrepreneur might cultivate a passive attitude of empty ‘pleasure’ which effectively deprives social entrepreneurship of its more radical possibilities. The paper concludes by

discussing the broader implications this hedonistic rendition of social entrepreneurship has and suggests a re-politicization of social entrepreneurship through a confronting with what Slavoj Žižek calls the ‘impossible.’

Keywords Social entrepreneurship · Ideology · Ideal subject · Affect · Enjoyment · Hedonism · Narratives · Intermediary organizations

Introduction

More than a decade ago, when the buzz around social entrepreneurship was in full swing, Dart (2004) put forward a thought-provoking investigation of the legitimacy of social entrepreneurship. The main point advanced by Dart is that the legitimacy of social entrepreneurship was morally and not pragmatically based; that is, social entrepreneurship has morphed into a legitimate organizational form not necessarily because it stood the test of reality (i.e., ‘it works!’), but because it was normatively connected to the dominant pro-business ideology which sees market-based approaches as the only pertinent way of addressing social and ecological problems. Hence, what is at stake in Dart’s treatise on legitimacy is that social entrepreneurship is more an ideological creation than a robust (i.e., empirically validated) way of using market mechanisms to advance the common good. The observation of social entrepreneurship being an ideological creation is still timely, especially during a period which is so vehemently depicted as ‘post-ideological’ (Bell 2000). It is thus one of the merits of Dart’s investigation to have unveiled that the appeal of social entrepreneurship stems in no small part from its kinship with the hegemonic pro-business ideology (Eikenberry 2009).

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Although we agree with many of Dart's assertions, we also believe that he too readily subsumes social entrepreneurship under a singular ideology. This is to deny that social entrepreneurship is in many ways a response to the 'global crisis of value' instigated by the ascendancy of free-market liberalism as the dominant political ideology. Consider, as an example, how Harvard-based management guru Michael Porter recently employed social entrepreneurship to prefigure an alternative economy which suspends the dogmatic share-holder ideology by identifying the fulfillment of social needs as a core-value of doing business (Driver 2012). Or consider how social entrepreneurship has been portrayed as a hybrid organization which combines philanthropic and market ideologies in largely productive ways (Moss et al. 2011). These tentative examples indicate that social entrepreneurship does not necessarily reduce the domain of ideological values to a singular logic. Although commentators keep accusing social entrepreneurship research of being too wedded to managerial and business ideologies (Eikenberry 2009; Hjorth 2013; Jones and Murtola 2012), we are reluctant to uncritically accept this analysis. After all, social entrepreneurship represents a passionate response to the hegemony of the pro-business, free-market ideology which insists that alternative ideological standards of economic organization are available.

Undoubtedly, one of the most influential actors in transmitting what social entrepreneurship is and what it is capable of accomplishing are intermediary organizations such as the Schwab Foundation, the Unreasonable Institute, or Ashoka. Intermediary organizations, also referred to as promotion agencies, incubators or 'field building actors' (Nicholls 2010), are highly effective in shaping the meaning of social entrepreneurship and, importantly, in mediating the experience of nascent and early-stage social entrepreneurs. The epistemic authority of intermediary organizations in defining the meaning of social entrepreneurship is based on different forms of material and discursive support, involving, for instance, specifically designed fellowship and education programs, coaching and mentoring, networking events, start-up competitions, the provision of seed money, or the creation of opportunities for co-working, dialogue, and experimentation. Aspiring to advance understanding of how intermediary organizations invoke ideologies to prompt others to think and act in particular ways, we draw on a qualitative single-case study of the Impact Hub network as one of the most prolific actors in advancing the cause of social entrepreneurship on a global scale. While a single-case study is pertinent for gaining a richness of insights, the focal attention of our investigation is on how the Impact Hub employs social entrepreneurship as an exemplary account of what it takes to lead a virtuous (working) life. Specifically, we shed light on how the Impact Hub interweaves different ideologies to establish a relatively coherent, temporarily stable sense of social entrepreneurship as an 'ideal subject.'

An ideal subject thus forms a moral guide which offers potential social entrepreneurs a sense of direction in their quest for virtuousness. In conducting our analysis, we invoke the work of Boltanski and his co-authors (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) which permits us to distinguish a total of seven generic ideologies that contain different justifications of how a 'state of greatness' can be achieved. Further, our investigation is predicated on the idea that any attempt at understanding the narration of social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject would be incomplete without consideration of the dimension of affect. Conceiving affect as that part of language which renders a given ideology compelling (Glynos et al. 2012; Stavrakakis 2008), we study how the Impact Hub summons beatific narratives to create a belief that becoming a social entrepreneur will eventually make life not only meaningful but also enjoyable.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After highlighting how 'ideology' has been used in previous research on social entrepreneurship, we conceptualize our own understanding of the term. After introducing our methodology and empirical case, we investigate how the Impact Hub narrates social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject which combines meaningfulness with the ability to enjoy. Taking issue with the hedonistic rendition of social entrepreneurship, we conclude with a plea to re-think social entrepreneurship through a confrontation with the 'impossible.'

'Ideology' in Existing Research on Social Entrepreneurship

Whereas theories of ideology have informed research on entrepreneurship for some time already (e.g., Armstrong 2001; Jones and Spicer 2010; Ogbor 2000), ideology has only recently become a subject of research on social entrepreneurship. There, ideology has been of paramount importance to the critical turn that took place toward the end of the 2000s (e.g., Boddice 2009; Curtis 2008; Dey and Teasdale 2013; Mason 2012; for an overview cf. Dey and Steyaert 2012). The meaning of the term 'ideology' in existing research on social entrepreneurship is quite heterogeneous. For instance, critically inclined investigations have approached social entrepreneurship as an ideology which, due to its managerial value basis (Hjorth 2013), instigates a commercialization of non-profit organizations (Eikenberry 2009; Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). In a similar vein, studies have looked at how powerful actors, such as policy makers, the media, or academia, invoke the ideology of social entrepreneurship to 'impinge' upon how people in society think and act (e.g., Dempsey and Sanders 2010; Dey 2014; Dey and Steyaert 2016; Dey and Teasdale 2015; Levander 2010). Exemplary in this

regard is the investigation by Dempsey and Sanders (2010) which showed how iconic narratives of successful social entrepreneurs normalize an understanding of meaningful work predicated upon notions of a lack of spare time, sleep deprivation, long working hours, and a non-existent personal life. Another stream of research has studied how social entrepreneurship operates as part of a work of ideological imagination that shapes reality according to distinct political dogmas. Instructive in this regard is the work of Mason and Moran (forthcoming) which looks at the specific role of social entrepreneurship in the British coalition government's Big Society program. While officially touted by government as an effective means of unleashing civil society's engagement in solving pressing societal problems, the authors maintain that the prime ideological function of social entrepreneurship is to abet cut-backs in essential public services. Pinpointing how ideology works to conceal the true aspirations underpinning the use of 'social entrepreneurship,' the research by Mason and Moran raises awareness that social entrepreneurship ideologically justifies a particular worldview, while at the same time restricting alternative ways of viewing reality.

Diverse as existing usages of 'ideology' in social entrepreneurship research may be, there are some broad areas of overlap. Underlying virtually all of this research is the assumption that ideology works mainly to conceal the antinomy between ideological representations of social entrepreneurship and actual reality. The basic thinking thus is that ideological renditions of social entrepreneurship work primarily to veil the true nature of reality, hence forming a "distortion of communication, a disturbance to be eliminated" (Žižek 1994, pp. 63–64). Evidently, ideology is used mainly in a pejorative sense (Andersson 2011). This chiefly reflects classical scholarly debates which define 'ideology' as "a system of wrong, false, distorted or otherwise misguided beliefs, typically associated with our social or political opponents" (van Dijk 1998, p. 2). Reminiscent of the seminal work by Marx and Engels, the negative rendition of ideology has witnessed an astonishing revival as a way of explaining epochal crises such as the recent meltdown of the financial system or the propaganda of Islamic State.

However, what a negative interpretation fails to understand is that ideology is also a fundamental principle in securing social consent and harmony, and is thus part and parcel of all functioning societies. This is not to say that ideology is necessarily 'good,' since the ideological fabrication of consent might well be based on values, beliefs, and representations that may effectively curtail freedom, justice, and collective agency. Thus, this article aspires to stress the importance of understanding that ideology is first and foremost instrumental in creating realities and subjects.

In doing so, we counteract perceptions of ideology as being solely a means to hide the genuine state of reality behind a veneer of 'false consciousness.' In more tangible terms, moving beyond approaches which connote 'ideology' in a negative sense, we conceive of ideology as a central mechanism for offering individuals an exciting model of their own potential and a moral justification of their role in society. Denoting ideology's function in relation to assigning meaning to their experience of becoming a particular kind of being, the issue that we are going to address is *how ideology works to portray social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject that signals toward others how they can attain a virtuous life.*

Conceptualizing Ideology: Ideal Subject, Narratives, and Affect

Our conceptualization of ideology is stimulated by three basic considerations: First, ideology works to create 'ideal subjects.' Second, narratives form the medium through which ideologies are interwoven into a relatively coherent, temporarily stable sense of how social entrepreneurs typically think and act. Third, the creation of an ideal subject through ideology involves two dimensions: signification (the level of meaning) and affect (the level of enjoyment).

Concurring with Althusser (1971) that "all ideology has the function of 'constituting' concrete individuals into subjects" (p. 115), this paper operates on the assumption that ideology works primarily to shape the way people conduct themselves by suggesting particular normative orientations of what it means to lead a 'good life.' To develop our argument, we invoke the notion of 'ideal subject' (alternatively referred to as 'ideal self'; e.g., Wieland 2010) which comprises the process of developing a 'blueprint' that stipulates how individuals should ideally act and think. Ideal subject comprises a normative identity model which others—i.e., the individuals whom the ideology addresses—must emulate. So conceived, an ideal subject rarely corresponds with an empirically extant individual. Instead, the ideal subject is a 'subject in gerundive' that delineates in what direction the individual should develop (Bröckling 2002). It is this appellative dimension which sets the concept of ideal subject apart from Weber's (1988) 'ideal type.' Although the two concepts *prima facie* appear to resemble each other, Weber's considerations were theoretical in nature, appealing to the world of ideas and, more specifically, to the creation of unified constructs through the accentuation of certain elements of a given phenomenon. The ideal subject on the other hand is concerned with the making of particular kinds of individuals, attending to how ideology shapes the

conduct of others by prescribing what people should think and do.

Transposed to the current context, ideal subject pertains to ideological narratives that sketch out how a prototypical social entrepreneur purportedly thinks and acts. The ideal subject of social entrepreneurship advises the individual why she or he should embark upon a career as a social entrepreneur. Importantly, individuals who are addressed or, as Althusser (1971) calls it, ‘interpellated’ as social entrepreneurs are not simply free to immerse themselves in a social entrepreneurial career, but morally obliged to accept social entrepreneurship as their ‘true self’ (Dey and Steyaert 2016).

Expanding on Althusser’s view of ideology, we conceive the creation of ideal subjects as being essentially a narrative accomplishment. Assuming that reality becomes meaningful via a process of language-mediated symbolization (Hall 1982), we view narratives as determining what forms of subjects become imaginable and, conversely, unimaginable. Narratives can thereby take on different forms, such as rituals, myths, movie clips, blogs and home-page entries, or mundane conversations. Ideology pertains to the evaluative dimension underpinning particular narratives (Jameson 1977). Ideologies are often not recognizable as such precisely since they are rooted in our ‘everyday thinking,’ which offers us frameworks of meaning with which to make sense of the world (Hall and O’Shea 2013, p. 9). The work of French sociologist Luc Boltanski and his co-authors is instructive for distinguishing different common sense ideologies that evoke particular ideal subjects. Two texts are particularly relevant: *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) and *On Justification* (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Boltanski and his co-authors thus develop—based on a study of canonical texts from political philosophy and management textbooks—an axiological matrix, which identifies a total of seven ideological ‘regimes’: the inspirational, domestic, renown, civic, market, industrial, and projective regimes (cf. Table 1).

These ideological regimes entail justifications concerning what it takes to achieve a ‘state of greatness.’ More specifically, they offer justifications of why a certain lifestyle or way of being is meaningful, morally sound, or intellectually sensible.

To get to the core of how social entrepreneurship is justified as an ideal subject that others should emulate, we draw on Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) to distinguish three basic patterns of justification: the first pattern (*the security dimension*) entails arguments emphasizing how individuals who engage as social entrepreneurs can be secured or secure themselves from impending risks. The second pattern (*the fairness dimension*) indicates how one’s engagement as a social entrepreneur can contribute to the

common good. The third pattern (*the excitement dimension*) clarifies what is ‘stimulating’ about being a social entrepreneur.

While Boltanski and his co-authors Chiapello and Thévenot permit us to grasp the semantic dimension of ideology, we assert that any attempt at understanding the ideological ‘grip’ of social entrepreneurship would be insufficient without consideration of the dimension of ‘affect.’ Drawing on affect-based theorizing on ideology (Glynos 2001, 2008; Glynos et al. 2012; Žižek 1989, 1994, 1999), we assert that the creation of an ideal subject to be pervasive presupposes affect as the medium which makes a particular ideological narrative compelling. An affective view does not so much point toward a sphere or experience outside ideology, but to those aspects of a given ideology which make this ideology ‘stick’ (Stavarakakis 2008). Affect gives ideology power by sketching out a sublime reality with which individuals can identify (Žižek 1989). The guiding idea in affect theory is that ideology has a fantasmatic dimension, whose primary function is to make a given reality (such as social entrepreneurship) palatable by endowing it with a sense of harmony, fullness, and enjoyment. Without this affective investment, ideology does not function (Žižek 1989). As Glynos et al. (2012) maintain, ideology’s sense of enjoyment is expressed mostly through fantasies that interweave beatific and horrific narratives. Such affective narratives restore belief in the possibility (of a future state) of harmony and fulfillment. By way of illustration, affect is ubiquitous in “moralizing literature that talks of a marvelous world which no one has ever really encountered” (Chiapello 2003, p. 169) but which iconic actors such as social entrepreneurs can possibly bring about. Moreover, portrayals of social entrepreneurship based upon charismatic individuals (Vasi 2009) comprise an affective core which is palpable in how these narratives offer individuals (i.e., potential social entrepreneurs) “attractive, exciting life prospects” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005, pp. 24–25). The important thing to note about affect is not whether a given narrative is true or not with regard to its positive content (Žižek 1994), but how it tries to compel individuals to identify with the narrative’s normative desideratum, thus making them think and act in particular ways.

Applying this conceptualization of ideology in our quest to study how intermediary organizations establish social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject, we address the following interrelated questions.

1. First, which ideological regimes are invoked in the narratives of our case organization, the Impact Hub, to assign meaning to the experience of becoming a social entrepreneur?
2. Second, how is the ideal subject of becoming a social entrepreneur justified through recourse to arguments pertaining to security, fairness, and excitement?

Table 1 Spectrum of ideological regimes according to Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), and Boltanski and Thévenaut (2006)

Ideological regimes
<i>The regime of inspiration</i> ...emphasizes creativity and originality. The regime of inspiration stresses the accomplishment of the individual, not that of social collectives or society at large
<i>The domestic regime</i> ...pertains mostly to the private sphere, particularly to the family. As such, the domestic regime emphasizes issues such as hierarchy, tradition and intimate social ties
<i>The regime of opinion</i> ...focuses on the fame, recognition and dignity of human beings in public sphere. The regime of opinion thus stresses the ability to influence and attract others
<i>The civic regime</i> ...stresses values of solidarity and respect. The principle value of the civic regime is justice
<i>The market regime</i> ...concerns itself with buying-selling and competition. The main value of the market regime is profit
<i>The industrial regime</i> ...puts technical and scientific approaches center stage. The key values of the industrial regime are performance and productivity
<i>The projective regime</i> ...primarily stresses the value of flexibility as epitomized in how network organizations structure their activities around projects

3. Third, how is the ideal subject of becoming a social entrepreneur made compelling through affective investments?

Before presenting our findings, we will sketch out the methodological approach of our inquiry.

Methodological Approach

Case Overview

Our investigation is based upon a qualitative single-case study of an intermediary organization. Studying a single case has the distinct advantage of paying adequate attention to the idiosyncratic qualities of the organization (Maxwell 1992), preferring depth and richness of insights to the generalizability of the results. While a single-case study aims to investigate the phenomenon at hand in great detail and, if possible, to infer theoretical insights from in-depth observations, the selection of the particular case is usually purposive and thereby driven by the judgment of the researcher based upon a variety of criteria (Patton 1990). The Impact Hub was selected as our case organization based on the criterion that it represents one of the most influential intermediary organizations in promoting the cause of social entrepreneurship worldwide. Its proven success in persuading people to become social entrepreneurs renders the Impact Hub an ideal candidate for studying how intermediary organizations invoke ideologies to prompt others to think and act in particular ways.

The first Hub was founded in London in 2005, and has since then developed into a global movement. At the time of writing this article, the Impact Hub network purportedly comprises more than 11,000 members and 60 hubs (individual locations with co-working spaces and tailored business services) distributed all over the world. The Impact Hub offers workshops, venture competitions, fellowship programs, prototyping sessions, and spaces for creative breakout, brainstorming, and co-working as a way of creating conditions that are conducive to the set-up of social entrepreneurial organizations. What interested us were less the specific measures the Impact Hub employs to select, educate, and coach individuals who have already expressed their desire to become social entrepreneurs. Rather, our primary interest was to study how the Impact Hub communicates toward outsiders how their engagement in social entrepreneurship can make their (working) life both meaningful and appealing.

Data Gathering, Analytic Procedure, and Paradigmatic Orientation

Based upon an ontological position which stresses that reality is socially mediated through a moving substrate of ideology, our research recognizes the importance of local context and the embeddedness of knowledge (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). Purporting that there can be no objective grasp of reality, as knowledge is always socially determined (Crotty 1998), our analysis homes in on official narratives of social entrepreneurship enacted by the Impact Hub. The choice of publically available accounts is

premised on the idea that such texts contain the Impact Hub's official understanding of social entrepreneurship which it deliberately uses to instill a desire in individuals to become social entrepreneurs. Data gathering involved a systematic selection and storage of publically available narratives of social entrepreneurship as they occur on the Impact Hub's homepage, PowerPoint presentations, annual reports and impact reports, promotion material such as event flyers, movies, as well as photographic material. Narratives were collected between October 2012 and June 2014. Our primary data set included 590 sources of text which were stored in a Dropbox folder to guarantee access by the two authors.

Our analysis, which took place between October 2013 and September 2014, proceeded in four steps. The first step involved the identification of text passages which explicitly dealt with social entrepreneurship. To this end, both authors read through the whole data set and inductively generated a list of 18 categories, such as 'inspiration,' 'impact,' 'business,' or 'purpose' (for a full overview of the inductive categories cf. Figure 1). To systematize our analysis, we relied upon the coding method suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990). The 18 categories were entered into NVIVO software. The content and labeling of the

categories were discussed by the two authors until a consensus was established. This procedure, referred to as investigator triangulation (Denzin 1978), enables consistency between the involved researchers and, importantly, ensures trustworthiness and credibility of the interpretations (Charmaz 2008).

The second step consisted of linking the 18 inductive categories to the seven ideological registers suggested by Boltanski and his co-authors. This two-tier process essentially manifests a combination of the so-called emic and etic research. The emic part of our research (also referred to as 'insider' orientation; Lett 1990) was geared toward identifying the empirical narratives of the Impact Hub, thus attending to the categories the various Impact Hubs employed to establish a specific account of their activities, objectives, and values. The etic part of our research (also called 'outsider' orientation; Lett 1990) in turn tried to relate these insights to conceptual frameworks established in the academic realm (Morris et al. 1999). Subjecting the inductive categories from the emic research to a second-order reflection based on the conceptual framework advanced by Boltanski and his colleagues chiefly allowed us to secure the validity of our insights by identifying convergences between different sources of knowledge




Fig. 1 Overview over analytic procedure

(Creswell and Miller 2000). Perhaps the greatest merit of this dual procedure is that it permits making the embedded insights of the Impact Hub meaningful beyond the immediate context of their production. With one exception (i.e., the hedonistic regime, which will be introduced in the findings section below), the matching between the inductive categories and Boltanski et al.'s ideological regimes was rather straightforward.

To subsequently identify the affective dynamic of the Impact Hub's narratives, we closely re-read the texts in a third step to identify segments which rendered a given account of social entrepreneurship affectively compelling. Specifically, affective text passages were operationalized as comprising "references to an idealized scenario promising an imagery of fullness or wholeness (the beatific side of fantasy), and, by implication, a disaster scenario (the horrific side of fantasy)" (Kenny and Fotaki 2014, p. 189). Investigator triangulation was again used to assure corroboration of observations between the two authors and, ultimately, the accuracy of our findings.

The last step consisted of writing up the case narrative, with particular emphasis being placed on the kind of ideal subject being constructed. The case narrative was structured along Boltanski and Chiapello's (2005) three levels of ideological justification: the security dimension, the fairness dimension, and the excitement dimension.

In presenting our results, we first discuss those aspects of the case narrative which were amenable to, and thus explicable via Boltanski et al.'s theoretical framework. Then, in a subsequent section we introduce and critically discuss the hedonistic justification of social entrepreneurship (which was not captured by Boltanski and his co-authors) by relating it to existing research on the 'society of command enjoyment.'

Findings

Narrating Social Entrepreneurship as Ideal Subject

Truthful to its role as a social entrepreneurship promotion agency, the Impact Hub relies upon a progressive story, which sketches out why others should become a particular kind of subject, that is, a social entrepreneur. As part of this, social entrepreneurship is identified as a solution to some of today's most pressing problems. Potential issues of concern addressed by the Impact Hub encompass phenomena as diverse as environmental degradation, problems related to aging (societies), food safety, global warming, poverty, and social exclusion, to name but a few. Social entrepreneurship thus produces new arguments about how issues of global concern can be effectively tackled through innovative and entrepreneurial solutions. As mentioned

above, the Impact Hub ascribes itself the role of creating the conditions which eventually allow social enterprises and entrepreneurs to blossom. Underpinning the narratives of the Impact Hub is a fundamentally optimistic prospect: although acknowledging that mankind is facing serious challenges, there is ostensibly no reason for despair as the entrepreneurial mechanisms, tools, and solutions for 'prototyping the future of business' are already at hand. Offering a narrative that attributes a central role to the social change potential immanent to business initiatives, narratives of social entrepreneurship are not utopian since they tend to appeal to an already existing movement of prolific 'change-makers.' The ideal subject of social entrepreneurship is envisioned as a purposive and inventive individual who aspires to lead a meaningful life by changing the way in which business is practiced. Such individualized stories of social entrepreneurship put in place a normative blueprint of the good (working) life which others can emulate. Yet, we should be cautious of treating the plot of the individual entrepreneur as the only story transmitted by the Impact Hub, since the perspective of the individual forms just one part of the prospect of becoming a social entrepreneur. Thus, to advance understanding of the minute and heterogeneous ideological regimes which inform the ideal subject of being a social entrepreneur, we use the next sections to illuminate how the Impact Hub beckons to individuals to become a particular kind of person.

Security Dimension

Security in Boltanski and Chiapello's (2005) account forms that part of an ideology which demonstrates how people's participation in a system such as capitalism provides security in the face of existing vulnerabilities and impending risks. Arguably, the ultimate risk associated with social entrepreneurship is failure (Scott and Teasdale 2012). In policy and academic circles, it has become commonplace to suggest that social entrepreneurs minimize the risk of failure by creating a sustainable revenue base. The attribute 'sustainable' thus chiefly signifies revenues resulting from the application of market mechanisms (i.e., earned income). Reflecting the market regime's emphasis on trading activities, the general thinking is that neither contributions by government nor by donors form a pertinent source of revenue for social entrepreneurs. Academic narratives are rife with discussions of how trading and earned-income strategies lead to financial self-sufficiency. In this way, trading represents the ultimate mechanism for making social enterprises 'viable' (Anderson et al. 2002). Interestingly, while academics frequently envision the market regime as an antidote to the looming 'death' of social enterprises, this argument does not

correspond with the narrative of the Impact Hub. Since even though the Impact Hub makes frequent mention of business (e.g., identifying business as a way of mobilizing otherwise untapped resources), it does not go as far as positioning market mechanisms as a means of fending off risks. Indeed, a conspicuous feature of the Impact Hub's narrative is that it tends to give priority to social entrepreneurship's potential and promise, while eschewing discussions of social entrepreneurship's obstacles and risks. It should be stressed here that issues pertaining to security are in fact part of the Impact Hub's narrative of social entrepreneurship. Even though hard to detect at first sight, two relatively stable sets of arguments can be identified. The first argument, related to security, links social entrepreneurship with innovativeness. Innovativeness is thereby delineated not only as the crucial mechanism for 'saving the world' (Sørensen 2008) but as the pre-eminent means for securing the viability of the social enterprise. Arguments dealing with innovativeness often circulate around questions of which qualities, skills, and abilities a social entrepreneur must possess so that a given idea, endeavor, or enterprise can be protected from failure. The ideal subject implied in this plot heralds an individual who is attentive to novel opportunities and latent possibilities that only few would be able to detect. Security is thus epitomized in the assumption that the social entrepreneurs worth thinking of are precisely those who willingly accept that they have to be innovative in order to ensure the survival of their ideas and organizations. Evidently, this imaginary reflects Boltanski and Chiapello's projective regime, which emphasizes flexibility and adaptability on the part of the individual. Innovativeness as a foundational attribute of the individual social entrepreneur also echoes the regime of inspiration whose central concern is the kind of creativity and originality being displayed by the individual.

However, it should be pointed out that the Impact Hub does not reduce innovativeness to an individual level (i.e., social atomism); rather, as the Impact Hub notes, a defining feature of innovativeness is precisely that '(i)mpact cannot happen in isolation.' A second argument dealing with security is thus based upon the notion of 'collectiveness.' The collectivist dimension of security is most evident in text passages where the prospect of becoming a social entrepreneur is related to, for instance, the establishment of partnerships, participatory innovation processes, or more generally to activities such as 'co-production' or 'sharing.' A vital dimension of the ideal subject is how the process of becoming a social entrepreneur involves assembling people into a coherent collective. Evidently, the idea of collectiveness points to Boltanski and Thévenaut's domestic regime which avers that security can be achieved through adherence to values such as loyalty and trustworthiness. In

line with the domestic regime, the Impact Hub makes it imperative to protect and care for the Hub collective, similar to how one would try to preserve one's own family.

This emphasis on collectiveness is notable as it has been more or less absent in academic discussions, especially during the nascent stage of social entrepreneurship research (Dacin et al. 2011). Moreover, collectiveness is an inherently affective construction, rather than an accurate description of reality. Even though it would be easy to prove that collectiveness is not an antidote against entrepreneurial risks in practice, the truly remarkable point to note is how collectiveness works affectively to convey the promise that individual social entrepreneurs cannot possibly fail, precisely because they are part of a greater collective of like-minded people. By purporting that individuals are not left to their own devices, narratives of the Impact Hub offer individuals a quasi-'foundational guarantee' (Glynos 2008) that shields them from the typical insecurities and risks related to entrepreneurial endeavors. Inherent in this view is the assumption of collectiveness as a means for achieving particular ends (i.e., security). It should be mentioned here that collectiveness is not only represented as a means toward other ends but frequently positioned as an end in itself. This point will be elaborated further in conjunction with the excitement dimension in a later section.

While our analysis of the security dimension has already revealed how narratives of social entrepreneurship hark back to the projective regime, the domestic regime, and the regime of inspiration, the ensuing two sub-chapters will exemplify the role of further ideologies in setting up social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject.

Fairness Dimension

Fairness involves arguments concerning how a certain way of life contributes to the public interest and the common good. In Boltanski and Chiapello's (2005) foundational work on the ideological justification of capitalism, fairness plays an obvious role since it is not self-evident that an individual's participation in the capitalist economy will necessarily yield results that are beneficial for society as a whole. In the case of the Impact Hub, however, fairness is not a justification in the conciliatory sense of the term. In contrast to Boltanski and Chiapello's *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, which revealed how capitalism was justified in the face of its negative ramifications such as exploitation, alienation, over-work, etc., the individual's engagement in social entrepreneurship is not charged with such legitimization pressures precisely because fairness is not an addendum but the very essence of social entrepreneurship. Therefore, instead of trying to vindicate social

entrepreneurship in the face of negative evidence and criticism, the Impact Hub simply gives an account of how individuals, by becoming social entrepreneurs, contribute to the common good. While the common good is subject to variegated interpretations, the most frequent interpretation associates the subject matter with notions of social (and ecological) impact. Notions of impact occur as part of the Impact Hub's name (*nomen est omen*; the name was changed from Hub to Impact Hub in 2013), but are also related to the Impact Hub's activities (e.g., the Social Impact Award) as well as its official rhetoric. The idea of impact as it is narrated by the Impact Hub epitomizes Boltanski and Thévenaut's civic regime, which emphasizes the rights of the collective and associated principles of solidarity and justice. On the other hand, narratives of impact reveal similarities with the industrial regime, which identifies aspects of effectiveness, performance, and derived productivity as the first and foremost responsibilities of organizations. These values are chiefly in line with academic and policy articulations which use 'performance' as a "powerful element in the case for social entrepreneurship" (Martin 2004, p. 14). To clarify, even though a spirit of 'getting things done' and a drive for performance are important components of the narrative of social entrepreneurship, perhaps one of the clearest effects of the Impact Hub's narratives is to undermine the idea of performance as it is understood in the context of strictly profit-driven enterprises. Unlike Boltanski and Thévenaut's industrial regime which relates performance to the productivity and efficiency of traditional businesses, performance and efficiency in the case of the Impact Hub are interlinked with the idea of the co-production of the common good. So understood, we can see that performance in the Impact Hub's account effectively conjoins the industrial and the civic regime, thus essentially merging formerly contradictory logics of civicness and industrial production.

At closer inspection, an ambivalence at the heart of 'performance' comes into focus. On the one hand, the narratives of the Impact Hub are replete with discussions of how social enterprises and entrepreneurs engender social and ecological impact. On the other hand, the intermediary stresses that measuring such performances is anything but trivial. Although conceding that the production of solid evidence of social impact might prove challenging, the Impact Hub adopts a sanguine position by suggesting that what really matters is less the 'hard evidence' of impact but the individual's commitment to performance. The Impact Hub thus averts the potential charge of paying too little attention to measuring social impact (Brandstetter and Lehner 2015) by affirming that what really matters is that individuals feel an urge to 'make a difference.' So, even though classical management procedures such as

strategizing, organizing, or accounting are still presented as part of the social entrepreneurial journey, the actual process of becoming a social entrepreneur seems to be critically linked to psychological states such as dedication, motivation, and passion, rather than to the application of measurable solutions. Bluntly put, the ideal subject emanating from this account does not produce an emphasis on 'real' performance but a psychological 'will to perform.' This image thus offers a very particular and arguably one-sided understanding of performance that homes in on the motivational factors of the individual, and thereby fails to acknowledge the pragmatic and collective dimension of change endeavors.

Excitement Dimension

In Boltanski and Chiapello's account, excitement involves those justifications which seek to convince people that their engagement in capitalism will animate and enliven them. We can trace several ways in which social entrepreneurship is portrayed as a locus of excitement. For instance, the excitement involved in becoming a social entrepreneur is crucially related to an eschatological belief in the redemptive qualities of market logics and practices (Dey and Steyaert 2010). As briefly discussed above, a sense of excitement is achieved through narratives stressing how the innovative deeds of the individual social entrepreneur ultimately benefit society as a whole. Similarly, a sense of excitement emanates through recourse to the notion of collectivity (cf. above) which invites us to think about the journey of becoming a social entrepreneurship in terms of 'sharing,' 'collaborating,' 'discussing,' or 'joining.' Having mentioned previously that collectivity is an essential ingredient of the security dimension, it is in the context of the excitement dimension that the term takes on a slightly different meaning. That is, collectivity becomes a source of excitement by way of how the experience of becoming part of a global movement of like-minded social entrepreneurs is depicted as a desired end goal. Regardless of whether collectivity eventually permits the social entrepreneur to set up a viable enterprise, the mere act of becoming a member of the Impact Hub community is positioned as an end worth striving for.

A pervasive component of the excitement dimension of social entrepreneurship is how it emulates the regime of opinion, which stresses the importance of honor and fame. What one is bound to see in narratives embodying a sense of excitement is how a career as a social entrepreneur involves becoming visible and recognizable in the public sphere through, for instance, award ceremonies, presentations or marketing, and public relations activities. Perhaps the most influential regime in conjuring a sense of excitement is the inspired regime, which values the passion and

creativity of the individual genius. However, there is no perfect correspondence between the narratives of the Impact Hub and Boltanski and Thévenaut's category. A focal attention of the inspired regime in Boltanski and Thévenaut's account is the commitment to the risks of one's enterprise and an acceptance of all the costs a given journey might entail. In contrast, the narrative of the Impact Hub does not contain any mention of, for instance, hardship and obstacles which might occur in the social entrepreneurial journey. Succinctly put, the Impact Hub contends that becoming a social entrepreneur does not necessarily presuppose any sacrifices on the part of the individual. A sense of excitement emerges precisely due to how narratives eclipse experiences of hardship and suffering which might prevent people from embarking upon a career as a social entrepreneur. Consequently, excitement results from the suggestion that the realization of the common good does not require that people fully dedicate their lives to their social entrepreneurial endeavor and thus potentially expose themselves to risks of self-exploitation and exhaustion (cf. Dempsey and Sanders 2010). Quite the contrary, the Impact Hub's stories of progress, which sketch out how social entrepreneurs use business tools to shape the future, is crisscrossed by a narrative which promotes social entrepreneurship as a genuinely pleasurable experience in the 'here and now.' The Impact Hub thereby displaces the traditional antithesis of work (which embodies values and virtues such as duty, obligation, or responsibility) and the idea of enjoyment (which is mainly seen as part of the experience of leisure time). Examples can be found in descriptions which equate the process of becoming a social entrepreneur with the experience of 'being inspired,' 'accessing creative energy,' and connecting with 'compassionate individuals focused on a common purpose.' On the face of it, the narrative of social entrepreneurship as an experience of enjoyment effectively supersedes the linear (and 'reductionist,' while we are at it) narrative of social entrepreneurship as a way of using business management to advance the common good. The lynchpin of the Impact Hub's narrative is the conviction that becoming a social entrepreneur allows individuals to 'have fun.' In essence, becoming a social entrepreneur renders the individual's life meaningful not simply by connecting it to a higher cause but by transforming it into a hedonistic journey. Embarking on a career as a social entrepreneur is presented not merely as a 'higher calling' (Dempsey and Sanders 2010) but as a potential source of affective enlightenment. The narrative of the Impact Hub calls upon the individual to become a social entrepreneur by exemplifying the kind of emotional experiences she or he can reap from such an engagement. In this way, the ideal subject is envisioned as an individual whose engagement as a social entrepreneur is primarily driven by the prospect of

pleasurable experiences. This imaginary in turn subordinates a more thorough debate on the ethical and political issue of social change to the imperative of enjoyment. It is this conundrum that is considered in the next section.

The Promise of Enjoyment and the Depoliticizing of Social Entrepreneurship

What can be inferred from what has just been said is that social entrepreneurship cannot possibly be regarded as a mere mimesis of the triumph of the market (Dart 2004), since the ideal subject being revealed in our analysis clearly exceeds traditional understandings of business as a form of organizing with primarily economic finalities. At the very core, becoming a social entrepreneur opens up a new way of doing business that requires innovativeness and 'willingness to perform' on the part of the individual to be successful (Lehner and Germak 2014). It is here that we can trace an important tension within the ideological narration of social entrepreneurship. On the one hand, social entrepreneurship is represented as a deeply individualistic undertaking. Conversely, the ideal subject entails notions of collectiveness, which takes its ideological cues from the domestic regime and its associated values of loyalty and trustworthiness, which are typical characteristics of the family. To complexify things even further, our results indicate that the ideal subject embodies—although to varying degrees—all of the seven ideological regimes described by Boltanski and his co-authors. Despite the apparent heterogeneity at the level of ideological meanings, narratives of social entrepreneurship are eventually united by an affective core. This 'core' consists of how the prospect of becoming a social entrepreneur is depicted as an essentially pleasurable experience. More precisely, one of the key features of the ideal subject is that it combines a sense of urgency with the possibility of enjoyment. Conflating more traditional notions of 'performance,' 'scaling,' or 'impact' with affectively charged terms such as 'inspiration' or 'being energized,' the narrative of the Impact Hub shapes the understanding of social entrepreneurship in ways that are amenable not only to the logic of the market regime but also to what could be called the 'hedonistic regime.'

The coalescence of the trajectories of 'doing good' and 'having fun' is interesting in light of recent debates on social entrepreneurship as a source of 'meaningful work.' In this body of work, there is a tentative consensus that social entrepreneurship offers individuals a meaningful work prospect based upon values such as integrity, empathy, spirituality, compassion, and honesty (e.g., Mort et al. 2003). A conspicuous aspect of this debate is that it has concerned itself mainly with explicitly moral virtues. In contrast, the figure of the social entrepreneur emanating from the narrative of the Impact Hub makes no distinction

between virtues of 'doing good' and egotistical motives of 'having fun.' Cast as an inherently pleasurable endeavor, a career as a social entrepreneur simultaneously marks a fulfillment of some higher purpose and a hedonistic injunction to enjoy. It is important to note that the promise of enjoyment results, at least in part, from how the Impact Hub avoids any detailed discussion of the struggles and hardship associated with social entrepreneurship, or the underlying political and structural causes of today's most pressing problems (Fyke and Buzzanell 2013). This avoidance of the intricacies and predicaments of social entrepreneurship is a precondition for rendering social entrepreneurship as a career prospect which appears attractive and which individuals can therefore embrace.

Together, these insights urge us to address the broader implications of the Impact Hub's account of social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject. Perhaps the most striking feature of the Impact Hub's narrative is that it precipitates a shift away from seeing social change as related to distinct ethical theologies and political objectives. Indeed, the hedonistic interpretation of the ideal subject diverts attention from seeing social change as predicated upon antagonistic, confrontational engagements with practices and belief systems of the political economy. We are not suggesting that the Impact Hub systematically denies social entrepreneurship any political ambitions and missions. Even a cursory glance at the web pages of the different national Impact Hubs will reveal that political social enterprises, such as advocacy organizations which try to raise awareness of silenced societal issues (such as HIV among young adults), are part of the intermediary's portfolio. Our concern is thus related more to how official narratives of the Impact Hub exclude the political underpinning of social enterprises by glossing over the fact that any attempt at producing change, even if based on ostensibly 'neutral' market mechanisms, is inherently political insofar as it aspires to alter the existing social order and relations of power.

To put things into a broader perspective, we can see that the hedonistic regime and its promise of enjoyment, which was not part of Boltanski and his co-authors' analytic framework, reflects recent ideological shifts which have taken place in many advanced liberal societies. More precisely, the promise of enjoyment, which is at the heart of the Impact Hub's narrative of social entrepreneurship, is an exemplary example of the shift from a 'society of prohibition' to a 'society of commanded enjoyment' (McGowan 2004). The imperative to enjoy reflects the ideological desideratum of consumer society, and thus prefigures a rather new mode of individual conduct and social production. Until very recently, a pervasive feature of how (advanced liberal) societies were ideologically governed was that people were required to renounce enjoyment, for

enjoyment was seen as a risk to the stability of society. McGowan calls this ideological orientation 'societies of prohibition', thus echoing Max Weber's work on the protestant ethic which dealt with how a religious ideological system eventually normalized an ethos of hard work, asceticism, and a renouncement of private pleasures. In this ideological universe, the imperative is to abstain from all forms of enjoyment during one's worldly life. Today, this logic has been firmly inverted: the primary duty of the subject in consumer society is no longer to renounce enjoyment but to enjoy as much as possible (Stavrakakis 2010). In today's societies of commanded enjoyment, which in McGowan's view are characteristic of the era of late capitalism, 'proper life' no longer consists of sacrificing enjoyment for the sake of order and consent, but precisely demands freeing oneself from values such as self-control, moderation, restraint, and hard work (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005), and to identify hedonistic pleasures as the categorical imperative. While it is not difficult to see that the Impact Hub's narrative of social entrepreneurship corresponds, in an almost perfect sense, to what has just been stated about the society of commanded enjoyment, it is important to attend to the potential dangers associated with this hedonistic regime. Ultimately, the culture of 'having fun' strips social entrepreneurship of much of its progressive value and necessary profoundness. The strong ambition to attain social change does not disappear from narratives of social entrepreneurship, but takes on a depoliticized form by moving from a focus on struggle, opposition, and antagonism to a range of non-confrontational (pseudo) practices and initiatives. In this way, the Impact Hub tends to normalize a view of social entrepreneurship that does not open up 'new worlds,' but mainly fosters a superficial engagement with reality. The imagery of social entrepreneurship being created by the Impact Hub ultimately risks engendering a 'worldless' ideological constellation (Žižek and Badiou 2005), which deprives would-be social entrepreneurs of any sense of the political and ethical urgencies which require attention.

Concluding Thoughts

The possibilities for progressive social change have underpinned many recent debates in Management and Organization Theory in general, and in Business Ethics more specifically. Of late, social entrepreneurship has taken center stage in these debates (e.g., Agafonow 2014; Mair et al. 2012; VanSant et al. 2009). It is thus fairly uncontroversial to claim that few concepts have lately been as successful in vying for the attention of academic, media professional, or politicians (Fyke and Buzzanell 2013). However, one should not be seduced into believing that

social entrepreneurship has remained unscathed. The truth is that social entrepreneurship has been subjected to various forms of critique. At least a few of those critiques have used theories of ideology to pinpoint the true reality hidden behind the smokescreen of euphoria produced by spectacular representations of social entrepreneurship (Mason and Moran, forthcoming). Although we generally embrace this kind of critical engagement, we also believe that existing ideological analyses might have too readily reduced social entrepreneurship to a singular value: the market logic. The principle concern of this article has been to show that although social entrepreneurship signifies the increasing reliance on market mechanisms and practices as a preferred way of instigating social change, it is largely untenable to suggest that social entrepreneurship is a mono-logical creation. While the principle purpose of our investigation was to challenge the ‘dominant ideology’ thesis exemplified at the outset of this paper (cf. Dart 2004), three insights merit particular attention.

First, and directly related to what has just been said, a key contribution of our investigation of the Impact Hub is to demonstrate that social entrepreneurship is ‘over-determined’ (Althusser 2005) in the sense of being shaped by multiple ideologies. Having disclosed how the narration of social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject interweaves a myriad of ideologies, our findings have made it clear that social entrepreneurship ultimately represents a “Wittgensteinian ‘family’ of vaguely connected and heterogeneous (ideological) procedures” (Žižek 1994, p. 67). This paper has offered a ‘first cut’ at understanding the polymorphous ideological foundation of social entrepreneurship. In this way, the work by Boltanski and his co-authors has been instrumental in gaining a better understanding of how intermediary organizations narrate social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject via different ideological regimes which offer specific justifications as to what it means to lead a virtuous (working) life. Whereas most ideological regimes invoked by the Impact Hub have a very long history (Boddice 2009), our inquiry raises some interesting issues about the ostensible newness of social entrepreneurship. Although most ideologies being employed in the narratives of the Impact Hub are historical rather than new, what is nevertheless new is the way in which the different ideological regimes are combined and interwoven into a relatively stable assemblage of meaning. Specifically, the Impact Hub has offered interesting insights with regard to how social entrepreneurship is used to forge links between ideological values which hitherto seemed incompatible. Perhaps the most revealing example pertains to how the prospect of becoming a social entrepreneur conflates traditional notions of doing business with hedonistic values of enjoyment. At this decisive point in our argument, it must be borne in mind that our insights cannot be generalized

beyond the context of the present inquiry. Further research is needed to consolidate, but also to differentiate our findings. An important focus for future research should therefore be to study how other intermediary organizations interweave different ideological registers to constitute social entrepreneurship as an ideal subject.

Second, a key insight of our investigation is that ideology does not work primarily to conceal and obscure, but to make the ideal subject of the social entrepreneur palatable to as many people as possible. Recent affect-based theorizing on ideology has put us in a better position to understand how narratives of social entrepreneurship are structured through accounts that render it an appealing career prospect for the individual. Essentially, our findings contribute to ongoing efforts to understand the ideological mechanisms which normalize specific views of what makes work and life meaningful. The Impact Hub serves as a paradigmatic example of a fundamental shift in how work is presented not only as necessary (e.g., as a way of securing income) but as attractive and exciting. Importantly, social entrepreneurship does not so much offer a moralizing blueprint of meaningful (work) life (i.e., ‘higher calling’; cf. Dempsey and Sanders 2010), but a hedonistic culture of ‘having fun.’ By implication, our investigation draws attention to how attempts at persuading individuals to become social entrepreneurs necessarily involve affective investments. Although much of this might appear self-evident, one must not forget that the promise of enjoyment might eventually be the driving motif behind individuals’ decision to become social entrepreneurs. A pressing task for future research would thus be to address the specific motives and desires of social entrepreneurs, while placing particular attention on the extent to which these individuals are drawn into a social entrepreneurial career because of hedonistic considerations. Studying the extent to which social entrepreneurs are influenced by the ideological operations of the intermediaries that support them seems exigent in light of the fact that ideology does not ipso facto determine ideal subjects. This is the case since individuals always preserve part of their ability to decenter and resist attempts geared toward defining their ‘true nature’ (Dey 2014; Dey and Steyaert 2016).

Third, having demonstrated that the conflation of social change and the hedonistic culture of ‘having fun’ eventually forecloses the properly political, our findings compel us to make room for “alternative views which are often in conflict with the wave of euphoria and optimism that is driving current theoretical development in the field of social enterprise and entrepreneurship” (Bull 2008, p. 272). Even though some commentators have suggested that the promise of enjoyment might create a sense of possibility which is conducive to political action (e.g., Gibson-Graham 2006), we feel that the hedonistic rendition of social entrepreneurship by the Impact Hub tends to give rise to a sense of ‘empty pleasure’ (McGowan 2004). Any ambition to counteract this situation by enlivening

the more progressive and radical dimension of social entrepreneurship (Dey and Steyaert 2012) prompts intriguing questions as to how, i.e., based upon which alternative ideologies, social entrepreneurship should be rearticulated. However, the point that bears emphasizing here is that we must not be tempted to try to define a universal meaning of social entrepreneurship. Our hesitation is related directly to the status of ideology: whenever one aspires to suggest a singular meaning of social entrepreneurship, the chances are that we simply exchange one ideology for another, thus potentially perpetuating the problem we set out to solve in the first place (Daly 2004). While it makes little sense to dictate a singular meaning of social entrepreneurship in an authoritative fashion, it might prove more productive to engage in a critical practice of non-closure (Laclau and Mouffe 2001), which tries to multiply the meaning of social entrepreneurship. Such a practice should be geared toward destabilizing the seeming wholeness and ‘coziness’ of dominant accounts of social entrepreneurship. Revealing how affect works in creating the illusion of harmony, the practice of non-closure involves dismantling the false promise of social entrepreneurship and a subsequent learning to embrace different kinds of enjoyment (Stavrakakis 2010) by establishing social entrepreneurship as “a utopia which [...] gains jouissance (enjoyment) of impossibility itself” (McMillan 2012, p. 177). The idea of impossibility invites us to re-think social entrepreneurship not as something which is de facto impossible (Žižek 2006). Demanding something that is impossible would indeed make little sense. In Žižek’s logic, demanding the impossible implies a duty to relate social entrepreneurship to demands that profoundly challenge the dominant social imaginary. So conceived, the impossible appeals to a radical re-politicizing of social entrepreneurship by relating the subject matter with ideological registers whose trajectory is explicitly ethical and political. The encounter with the impossible thus precipitates a fundamental shift in the prospect of social entrepreneurship: “what appeared impossible, what did not belong to the domain of (social entrepreneurship’s) possibilities, all of a sudden—contingently—takes place, and thus transforms the coordinates of the entire field” (Žižek 2006, p. 77). Based on these considerations, a central concern for future research should be to engage directly with intermediary organizations, asking fundamental questions as to if and how they can transform social entrepreneurship into a social force which effectively explodes the limits of the possible.

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